

SEP 13 1978

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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-419

JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING Co., *Petitioner,*

v.

ROBERT E. SMITH, *Respondent.*

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT**

MATTHEW E. MURRAY
RODY P. BIGGERT
Suite 4200
55 East Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603

*Attorneys for Petitioner.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.*

Of Counsel:

THOMAS P. GIES
GARRETT E. BROWN

SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER
& GERALDSON
Suite 4200
55 East Monroe Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603

SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER
& GERALDSON
Suite 350
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

STRYKER, TAMS & DILL
33 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07107

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**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
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 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT**

 Petitioner, Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., respectfully prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the opinion, judgment and order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported unofficially at 17 FEP Cases 1188 and is reproduced herein as Appendix A. The decision of the district court is reported unofficially at 17 FEP Cases 1188 and is reproduced herein as Appendix B. A previous opinion of the district court is reported at 419 F. Supp. 770 and is reproduced herein as Appendix C.

JURISDICTION

The Opinion and Judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on July 14, 1978, (Appendix A). Petitioner invokes the Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Third Circuit, in reversing the judgment of the district court and overruling its own prior decisions, erred in finding that the commencement of proceedings before a state agency is not required before bringing an action in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, where there is a state agency empowered by statute to conduct such proceedings.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The statutory provisions involved herein include relevant portions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 *et seq.* (hereinafter referred to as the "ADEA"), and are reproduced in Appendix D. In particular, section 14(b) of the ADEA provides,

In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty (60) days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated. . . .

29 U.S.C. § 633(b).

Other relevant statutory provisions involved are section 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 270, *et seq.*, and are also reproduced in Appendix D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner, Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. ("Petitioner") employed Respondent, Robert E. Smith ("Respondent") for some twenty years as Industrial Manager at its Brooklyn, New York brewery. Respondent was retired in December, 1973, following the shutdown of the Brooklyn plant in March of that year, and after efforts by Petitioner to locate another job for Respondent proved unsuccessful.

Believing he had been discriminated against because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 *et seq.* ("ADEA"), Respondent initiated this action in December, 1975, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Respondent admittedly did not commence proceedings under the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 290 *et seq.*, prior to bringing this action.¹

Petitioner moved to dismiss Respondent's complaint because of his failure to commence proceedings before an appropriate state agency prior to instituting an action in federal court, as required by section 14(b) of

¹ The parties agreed that New York was the appropriate state in which Respondent could have sought relief for his claim of age discrimination (App. A at 3a).

the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 663(b). *See, Goger v. H.K. Porter Co.*, 492 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1974). The district court denied Petitioner's motion. *Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.*, 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976) (App. C). The court therein concluded that section 14(b) of the ADEA imposes no jurisdiction prerequisite on an ADEA plaintiff, and, therefore, that Respondent was not required to commence proceedings under the New York Human Rights Law prior to bringing this action. 419 F. Supp. at 774.

Petitioner subsequently filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, again asserting lack of jurisdiction in view of Respondent's failure to commence proceedings before an appropriate state agency before filing an ADEA action in federal court. Petitioner's renewed motion largely was premised on subsequent decisions of the Third Circuit establishing the section 14(b) requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite to commencing an ADEA action. *See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.*, 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). The district court subsequently granted Petitioner's renewed motion, relying primarily on *Rogers, supra*, and entered summary judgment accordingly (App. B).

The Third Circuit, on July 14, 1978, reversed *Rogers* and *Goger* and held that resort to state agency discrimination remedies is not a precondition to maintaining a federal ADEA action. *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.*, No. 77-1867, 17 FEP Cases 1175 (3rd Cir., July 14, 1978) (*en banc*). The district court's judgment in the instant case accordingly was reversed. *Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.*, No. 77-1745, 17 FEP Cases 1188 (3rd Cir., July 14, 1978) (App. A).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Court Below Has Decided an Important Question of Federal Statutory Construction in Direct Conflict With Indistinguishable Decisions of Other Appellate Courts

The question of whether an ADEA plaintiff must initially resort to a state agency authorized to resolve complaints of age discrimination has proved most difficult for the lower courts to resolve, including the circuit within which this case arises. The result has been a series of conflicting decisions, both among and within the various circuits, which demands resolution by this Court. *Maggio v. Zeitz*, 333 U.S. 56 (1948); *John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels*, 308 U.S. 180 (1939).

The Third Circuit, for example, has expressed no fewer than three different opinions as to the extent to which an ADEA plaintiff is obligated to pursue state administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. In *Goger, supra*, the court held that initial resort to a state agency by an ADEA plaintiff is required by section 14(b) of the ADEA, at least to the extent that the state "be given a threshold period of sixty days in which to resolve the controversy," 492 F.2d at 15. The *Goger* court further held that certain equitable considerations might warrant an excuse from this requirement.²

² The *Goger* court excused the plaintiff's noncompliance with section 14(b) of the ADEA, because of the "total absence" of any judicial decision construing the deferral provision. 492 F.2d at 17. Judge Garth concurred in the result, but viewed section 14(b) as imposing no requirement on an ADEA plaintiff to attempt to utilize available state remedies before initiating an ADEA action. 492 F.2d at 17-18.

In *Rogers, supra*, the court reaffirmed *Goger*, holding that the initial deferral requirement of section 14(b) of the ADEA is jurisdictional. 550 F.2d at 843-44. Then, in *Holliday, supra*, the appellate court expressly overruled both *Goger* and *Rogers*, concluding that "no prior resort to state agency procedures is required as a precondition" to commencing an ADEA action. 17 FEP Cases at 1181. The *Holliday* court began its reexamination of the deferral issue with the acknowledgement that the decisions in this area are in conflict:

The proper interpretation of Section 633(b), requiring as it does the harmonization of admittedly mixed statutory signals, has understandably given rise to a multitude of cases and, inevitably to differences in result. Those courts which followed our *Goger* decision have in large part adopted the majority's analysis and, by analogizing section 633(b) to the purportedly comparable provision in Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)), have required resort to state age discrimination remedies before federal suit may be instituted. Other courts and jurists, the administrative agency charged with enforcement of the ADEA, a joint congressional committee, and certain commentators have cited the *Goger* concurrence and have agreed with the analysis in that opinion that section 633(b) of the ADEA affords the plaintiff an initial choice of forum.

Recognizing the conflict that existed among the various statutory interpretations and faced with increased instances of claimants who had not resorted to state remedies, or had done so in an untimely fashion, and further aware of the policy considerations which inclined toward the complainant's choice of forum, we deemed it appropriate to once more examine the issue decided in Goger.

17 FEP Cases at 1177-78 (footnotes omitted). (emphasis added).

The *Holliday* opinion, relied on by the appellate court in the instant case, is admittedly at odds with the decisions and reasoning of several other circuits. Thus, the Second Circuit in *Reich v. Dow Badische Co.*, No. 76-7637, 17 FEP Cases 363 (2d Cir., April 4, 1978), recently affirmed the dismissal of an ADEA action because of plaintiff's failure to commence proceedings under the identical state statute involved in the instant case, the New York Human Rights Law, as well as for failure to satisfy the requirement of section 7(d) of the ADEA that a plaintiff give written notice of intent to sue with the United States Department of Labor within sixty days before he files suit. Recognizing the similarity between section 14(b) of the ADEA and a virtually identical provision contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e *et seq.* (hereinafter referred to as "Title VII"),³ and with the recognition that initial deferral to an available state agency is "fundamental to the ADEA structure," the *Dow Badische* court concluded that the plaintiff's failure to comply with section 14(b) was a bar to maintaining an ADEA action. 17 FEP Cases at 367.⁴

³ Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) requires initial deferral of Title VII claims to appropriate state agencies. Commencement of proceedings before such an agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining a Title VII action *Love v. Pullman Co.*, 404 U.S. 522 (1972).

⁴ Judge Danaher's concurrence and Judge Feingerg's dissent in *Dow Badische* further illustrate the need for this Court's clarification of the question posed herein.

The Ninth and First Circuits have similarly followed *Rogers* and *Goger* in *Curry v. Continental Airlines*, 513 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1975), and *Hadfield v. Mitre Corp.*, 562 F.2d 84 (1st Cir. 1977) respectively, to the effect that section 14(b) of the ADEA imposes a prior resort requirement on an ADEA plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit in *Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp.*, 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978) has refused to follow the *Goger* analysis, concluding rather that an ADEA plaintiff has an option of pursuing state remedies or proceeding directly into federal court. 573 F.2d at 955.

The Eighth Circuit has exhibited the same ambivalence as the Third Circuit. In *Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co.*, No. 77-1692, 17 FEP Cases 221 (8th Cir., April 5, 1978), the court concluded that initial report to an available state agency is compelled by Section 14(b) of the ADEA. Some three months later, following the Sixth Circuit's *Gabriele* decision, the Eighth Circuit withdrew its first opinion in *Evans*, noted the conflicting authorities, and adopted the view of the Sixth Circuit. *Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co.*, No. 77-1692, 17 FEP Cases 1119, 1121 (8th Cir., July 6, 1978). District Court opinions are equally inconsistent.³

In summary, the Circuits are in open disagreement and clarification of the ADEA's state agency deferral provision by this Court is thereby mandated.

II. The Decision of the Lower Court Misconstrues an Important Jurisdictional Prerequisite of the ADEA

The Third Circuit's opinion in this case was based squarely on *Holliday*. In *Holliday*, the court rejected

³ See *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove*, *supra*, 17 FEP Cases at 1177 and cases cited therein.

the statutory construction given section 14(b) in *Goger*, and concluded that prior resort to an available state administrative agency was not required. Citing the Court's decision in *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), the court rejected the analogy made in *Goger* between section 706(c) of Title VII and section 14(b) of the ADEA. The court pointed to other ADEA statutory language dictating that a federal ADEA action "shall supersede any state action" as reason for lesser deference to state procedures than under the Title VII enforcement mechanism. A second supposed distinction noted between section 706(c) of Title VII and section 14(b) was that Title VII provides that "no charge may be filed . . . before the expiration of sixty days," while the comparable ADEA provision states that "no suit may be brought . . . before the expiration of sixty days."

The court interpreted this statutory difference, which allows charges to be filed with the Department of Labor immediately under the ADEA with the possibility of concurrent administrative action by the state and federal agencies, was interpreted as further evidence of lesser deference to state procedures under the ADEA. The court also mentioned the construction of section 14(b) urged by the Secretary of Labor, and cited a passage in a Senate Report accompanying the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, both to the effect that section 14(b) should not be interpreted as imposing a prior resort requirement. Finally, the court noted the remedial purpose of the ADEA, which it felt would be frustrated by forcing an employee to commence proceedings before an appropriate state agency before proceeding in federal court, and concluded that reversing *Goger* would result in a "more straightforward ap-

proach to fulfilling the remedial purposes of the ADEA." 17 FEP Cases at 1181, n.36.

Nevertheless, the Third Circuit's decision is anything but straightforward. In 1967, Congress passed the ADEA, and devised what it determined to be the preferable and most efficient procedure for resolving claims of age discrimination. That scheme provided for both the Department of Labor and an appropriate state agency to have an opportunity to settle a charge. The Third Circuit, however, while contributing mightily to the confusion in this area of the law, effectively rewrote the ADEA charge handling procedure by giving an aggrieved individual his "option" of pursuing state administrative remedies.

The premise for this improper judicial legislation was the Holliday court's view that the language of section 14(b) differs from that of the comparable provision in Title VII. The announced differences between the two provisions were previously viewed as "minor" by the court in *Goger*, which characterized the two provisions as "virtually identical." *Goger v. H.K. Porter, supra*, 492 F.2d at 15; *Curry v. Continental Airlines, supra*, 513 F.2d at 693.

This Court's intervening decision in *Lorillard v. Pons, supra*, contrary to the opinion of the court below, does not call the *Goger* statutory analysis into question. In *Lorillard*, this Court determined that the ADEA provided a private plaintiff with a right to jury trial. After observing that the ADEA represents a "hybrid" of the various alternative proposals pending in Congress when the Act was passed, the Court found that the ADEA's enforcement mechanism resembled that of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29

U.S.C. § 201 *et seq.*, ("FLSA") and concluded that the right to a jury trial under the latter statute should obtain under the former. 434 U.S. at 580. The Court in *Lorillard* rejected the employers comparison of the ADEA and Title VII in that context, noting that the ADEA's remedial provisions were seemingly patterned after those of the *FLSA*, in that actions for money damages were plainly anticipated. 434 U.S. at 579. The Court in *Lorillard* clearly did not reject every comparison between Title VII and the ADEA and its holding properly is limited to the facts before it. *See, Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp.*, 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978). Comparison between the two statutory schemes is fully appropriate in this case, where it is apparent that an ADEA provision has been derived from Title VII, *Bertsch v. Ford Motor Co.*, 415 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Thus, there is no reason to adopt an interpretation of the ADEA contrary to the Supreme Court's construction of the related Title VII provision in *Love v. Pullman, supra*, *Goger v. H.K. Porter, supra*, 492 F.2d at 16.

In the instant case, the Third Circuit improperly extended the *Lorillard* rationale to a situation involving the very different question of how to interpret the section 14(b) deferral requirement of the ADEA. As the Second Circuit noted in *Dow Badische*, such a view is the result of a misreading of the legislative intent of this provision:

Much of appellant's argument mistakenly proceeds on the tacit premise that resort to the state remedy is a technical step devoid of substantive content, and that, therefore, the slightest of showing will warrant setting the bar of Section 633(b) aside. That ignores the paramount circumstances, that the state remedy, or rather remedies, pre-

sented appellants with a full and adequate system of relief, that there was no reason for turning to the federal remedy that did not equally direct appellant to the state remedies, and that the scheme of the ADEA very explicitly requires that the grievant timely present his claim to the state authority before suing.

17 FEP Cases at 368.

The appellate court similarly erred in relying on language in a 1978 Senate Report accompanying recently-enacted amendments to the ADEA. 17 FEP Cases 1180-81. As the court acknowledged, such reliance is hazardous, and particularly so where the report consists of nothing more than the unsolicited expression of opinion of a Senate committee staff. Section 14 of the ADEA was not amended in 1978, and the question of the proper interpretation to be given Section 14(b) in the context of this case was not the topic of debate. Such "legislative history", eleven years after the fact, must not be given much weight by this Court. The views of the Secretary of Labor in this regard, adopted well after the passage of the ADEA, are equally insufficient to support a statutory interpretation inconsistent with the evidenced intent of Congress. Cf., *General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert*, 429 U.S. 129 (1976). Finally, the recognition of the remedial purposes of the ADEA does not warrant a court's refusal to adhere to a statutory enforcement scheme created by Congress. *Reich v. Dow Badische Co.*, *supra*, 17 FEP Cases at 370.

This case thus presents the Court with the opportunity to resolve a critical question concerning the role of the states in ADEA enforcement. As acknowledged by the Third Circuit in this case, a very large number of cases have and will continue to present the problem of an ADEA claimant who has failed to pursue available state remedies before filing an ADEA action, only to be confronted with inconsistent judicial response to the problem. This important issue must be resolved.

CONCLUSION

Congress plainly envisioned that the states play an important role in attempting to resolve complaints of age discrimination. The decision of the Third Circuit in *Holliday*, as followed in the instant case, is in admitted conflict with the Second Circuit's decision in *Dow Badische*. It is also contrary to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in *Curry* and the First Circuit's view in *Hadfield*. This case, therefore, advances a vital threshold question with respect to the most appropriate procedure for quickly redressing claims of age discrimination.

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari be issued to review the judgment and decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW E. MURRAY
 RODY P. BIGGERT
 Suite 4200
 55 East Monroe Street
 Chicago, Illinois 60603

*Attorneys for Petitioner,
 Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.*

Of Counsel:

THOMAS P. GIES
 GARRETT E. BROWN
 SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER
 & GERALDSON
 Suite 4200
 55 East Monroe Street
 Chicago, Illinois 60603

SEYFARTH, SHAW, FAIRWEATHER
 & GERALDSON
 Suite 350
 1800 M Street, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20036

STRYKER, TAMS & DILL
 33 Washington Street
 Newark, New Jersey 07107

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT (PHILADELPHIA)

No. 77-1745

SMITH v. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO.

Full Text of Opinion

GARTH, Circuit Judge:—Again, we are presented with an appeal involving an employee's failure to resort to state age discrimination remedies before instituting federal suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).¹ Our court in *Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc.*, 492 F.2d 13, 7 FEP Cases 71 (3d Cir. 1974), had previously required that resort must first be had to state administrative proceedings. We had then held in *Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Corp.*, 550 F.2d 834, 844, 14 FEP Cases 518, 525-526 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 749, 16 FEP Cases 501 (1978), that such prior state resort was a "jurisdictional" prerequisite. Today, however, we have overruled *Goger* and its progeny, and have "h[e]ld that resort to state age discrimination remedies is not a precondition to maintaining a federal suit for age discrimination." *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.*, No. 77-1867, at 2, 17 FEP Cases 1175 (3d Cir. July 14, 1978) (in banc). Thus, we reverse the district court's order of summary judgment in favor of Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company (Schlitz), the employer, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The plaintiff, Robert E. Smith, a New Jersey resident, was hired by Schlitz on October 20, 1952. Throughout his employment, he served as Industrial Relations Manager of the Schlitz brewery in Brooklyn, New York. As early as 1969, Schlitz began formulating plans to close its Brooklyn

¹ Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.

brewery. Beer production at the Brooklyn plant ceased in March, 1973. The plant was sold toward the latter part of that year, and from March through December of 1973 Smith continued to serve as resident manager. Although Schlitz was then planning to open a new brewery in Syracuse, New York, at no time did Schlitz offer to employ Smith at, or relocate him to, the new facility. Thus, on December 31, 1973, Smith was forced into involuntary retirement at age 62.²

Smith, claiming that Schlitz's actions violated the ADEA,³ sought assistance from those administrative agencies charged with combating age discrimination in employment.⁴ Smith alleged that he first visited the New York City

² Apparently, the mandatory retirement age for all Schlitz employees is 65. Amended Complaint ¶ 4.

³ 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) provides that:

It shall be unlawful for an employer—

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, *because of such individual's age*; . . .

(Emphasis added.) See Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 1 June, 1978)) ("no . . . seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual . . . because of the age of such individual"); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 100, 1001 (retirement plans in effect before the enactment of the ADEA are *not* exempt from § 623(f)(2)).

Discussions of age discrimination and of the ADEA are furnished in Note, *The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967*, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 380 (1976); Note, *Age Discrimination in Employment*, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 924, 945-51 (1975). The 1978 amendments to the ADEA are highlighted in Explanatory Notes, 46 LW 53-57 (May 9, 1978).

⁴ The actions which Smith took in pursuit of his claim are set forth in detail in an uncontroverted affidavit (hereinafter Smith Affidavit), which was filed in opposition to Schlitz's motion for summary judgment.

office of the United States Department of Labor (Department). There he was advised to file his complaint with that Department's office in Paterson, New Jersey because he resided in that state. Despite this direction, Smith contends that he nevertheless placed a telephone call to the New York State Human Rights Division in Manhattan.⁵ "After a considerable conversation, consisting mostly of [the state representative] questioning [Smith],"⁶ Smith was again advised to file his complaint with the Department office nearest his home. This advice was predicated upon the consideration that Schlitz was no longer conducting business directly in New York, and had no corporate or regional office there.⁷

Having been advised by both the Department and the New York Division of Human Rights that the proper office in which to lodge his complaint was the Department's office in Paterson, New Jersey, Smith did just that.

After the Department's conciliation attempts with Schlitz had failed, Smith instituted in federal court the present action charging age discrimination. Thereafter, Schlitz moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative for summary judgment. Among other grounds for its motion,⁸ Schlitz asserted that Smith had failed to satisfy the juris-

⁵ The parties agree that since the alleged acts of age discrimination occurred in the State of New York, the New York Division of Human Rights is the state authority with power "to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).

⁶ Smith Affidavit, ¶ 4.

⁷ Id. ¶ 5.

⁸ The other grounds which were asserted, although not relevant to this appeal, were Smith's failure to notify the Secretary of Labor of his "intent to sue" as required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (prior to 1978 amendment), and a concomitant failure to allege the date of the notice of intent to sue.

dictional prerequisite contained in 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) requiring prior resort to state age discrimination remedies.*

The district court, construing *Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Corp.*, supra, to require strict compliance with this jurisdictional prerequisite, entered judgment for Schlitz.¹⁰ The sole ground for this ruling was Smith's asserted failure to commence state age discrimination proceedings.¹¹

* 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) provides in pertinent part:

In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated

¹⁰ At an earlier proceeding the district court had denied Schlitz's motion to dismiss Smith's complaint, as it interpreted Goger not as a strict jurisdictional holding but as one that permitted equitable relief. 419 F.Supp. 770, 12 FEP Cases 1494 (D. N.J. 1976).

¹¹ See Civ. Docket No. 75-2216, Transcript of Proceedings at 2 (D. N.J. Feb. 14, 1977) (reproduced at Appellee's Appendix at 3).

Schlitz's motion filed on Jan. 24, 1977, sought an order dismissing the complaint "or in the alternative, for summary judgment." Attached to the motion was the affidavit of Frederic W. Decker, Schlitz's Director of Compensation and Benefits. The district court's order of February 18, 1977, dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment in favor of Schlitz. The preamble to that order recited that defendant's motion had been brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56, and that the court had considered affidavits submitted by both parties. As noted, Smith had already submitted an affidavit in opposition to an earlier motion made by Schlitz. See n.4 supra. The district court therefore properly treated Schlitz's later motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

II.

On February 17, 1978, the date on which we heard oral argument in Smith's appeal, our court had pending before it at least one other appeal brought by an ADEA claimant who had been denied relief because he too had failed to resort to state age discrimination remedies prior to instituting a federal action.¹² In addition, our court in yet a third case was considering whether the Secretary of Labor must resort to state remedies before bringing an age discrimination suit in federal court.¹³ These filings brought to a total of at least six the number of section 633(b) cases instituted within just the last four years before our court alone.¹⁴ Thus, our court entered an order to reconsider *in banc* the "jurisdictional prerequisite" issue as presented in *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.*, No. 77-1867 (Order granting reconsideration *in banc* dated Mar. 13, 1978), one of the pending section 633(b) appeals.

Recognizing that the outcome of the *in banc* proceeding would control the instant case, we postponed decision in this appeal pending this court's decision in *Holliday*.¹⁵ As

¹² *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.*, No. 77-1867, 17 FEP Cases 1175 (3d Cir. filed May 26, 1977).

¹³ *Marshall v. West Essex General Hosp.*, No. 77-1758 (3d Cir. argued Feb. 14, 1978), decided on other grounds, No. 77-1758, 575 F.2d 1079, 17 FEP Cases 702 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 1978).

¹⁴ *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove Inc.*, No. 77-1867, 17 FEP Cases 1175 (3d Cir. July 14, 1978) (*in banc*); *Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.*, No. 77-1745 (3d Cir. July 14, 1978); *Marshall v. West Essex General Hosp.*, No. 77-1758, 575 F.2d 1079, 17 FEP Cases 702 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 1978); *Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc.*, 569 F.2d 187, 16 FEP Cases 510 (3d Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 LW 3695 (U.S. May 1, 1978) (No. 77-1562); *Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.*, 530 F.2d 834, 14 FEP Cases 518 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 749, 16 FEP Cases 501 (1978); *Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc.*, 492 F.2d 13, 7 FEP Cases 71 (3d Cir. 1974).

¹⁵ Counsel were notified of this action by the Clerk of this Court.

earlier noted, today we have held, "contrary to our holding in Goger, that no prior resort to state agency procedures is required as a precondition to commencing a federal action charging age discrimination under the ADEA." *Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.*, No. 77-1867, at 18, 17 FEP Cases, at 1181. Our opinion in *Holliday*, then, influenced as it is by the recent Supreme Court decision in *Lorillard v. Pons*, 434 U.S. 575, 46 LW 4150, 16 FEP Cases 885 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1978), as well as by "public policy concerns, congressional predilection, and our own unease with a judicial impediment to remedial legislation," No. 77-1867, at 17, 17 FEP Cases, at 1181, overturns the jurisdictional requirement imposed by *Goger* and *Rogers*, and instead now affords complainants under the ADEA an initial choice of forum.¹⁸

Here the district court, understandably relying upon this court's precedents, entered judgment for Schlitz, the employer, because Smith had failed to commence state proceedings before filing his federal action. Our decision in *Holliday v. Ketchum* rejects such a requirement. That ruling now controls this appeal, making it unnecessary to consider in Smith's case the need for, or possibility of, equitable relief. Thus, in light of *Holliday v. Ketchum*, the order of the district court will be reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

¹⁸ Once a plaintiff has chosen the state route, however, the state must be afforded sixty days to pursue the age discrimination complaint before a federal suit may be filed. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b), quoted in part in n.9 *supra*. After the 60-day period, deference is no longer warranted; indeed, a federal suit filed by the complainant necessarily supersedes the state proceeding, regardless of the status of the latter. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a).

APPENDIX B

U.S. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

No. 75-2216, February 22, 1977

SMITH V. JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO.

Full Text of Order

STERN, District Judge:—This matter having come before the Court on defendant's renewed motion to dismiss the complaint, and in the alternative for summary judgment, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to F.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 56, and the Court having considered the briefs and affidavits submitted by both parties, and the Court having heard oral argument on February 14, 1977, and having considered same, and good and sufficient cause having been shown.

It is on this 18 day of February, 1977,

ORDERED, that defendants renewed motion to dismiss the complaint, and in the alternative for summary judgment, be, and it hereby is, granted.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, D. NEW JERSEY

Civ. A. No. 75-2216

May 28, 1976

Robert E. SMITH, Plaintiff,

v.

JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY, Defendant.

Opinion

STERN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and in the alternative for summary judgment. By letter of April 7, 1976, the Court notified the parties that the portion of the motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) would be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, as provided in Rule 12(b). Counsel presented oral argument to the Court on May 14, 1976, and decision was reserved.

Defendant premises its motion to dismiss on three arguments:

- (1) The complaint fails to allege that plaintiff commenced procedures under New York's Human Rights Law, as defendant contends he was required to do before instituting suit, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d) and 633(b), and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint fails to state a claim;
- (2) Plaintiff failed to give notice to the Secretary of Labor of his intent to sue until October 6, 1975, beyond

the time limit established by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), and therefore the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction;

(3) Paragraph 12 of the complaint fails to state the date on which plaintiff gave notice to the Secretary of his intent to sue, and therefore the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint fail to meet the requirements of F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's factual allegations, which the Court is required to take as proved for the purposes of these motions, may be briefly summarized.

Plaintiff is a New Jersey citizen who was hired by defendant on October 20, 1952. Throughout his employment with defendant, plaintiff was Industrial Relations Manager of defendant's Brooklyn brewery.

Plans to close the Brooklyn plant had begun to be formulated sometime in 1969. After the plant ceased production on March 16, 1973, plaintiff was appointed resident manager through December, 1973, to assist in the sale of the plant, its equipment and its machinery. On August 22, 1973, plaintiff had his 62nd birthday. According to defendant's rules and regulations, he would not have had to retire until age 65, or on or about August 22, 1976. Nevertheless, plaintiff was involuntarily retired by defendant on December 31, 1973.

Plaintiff contends that "as early as 1969," he had discussed his future status with defendant in light of defendant's known intention to close the Brooklyn plant. Plaintiff alleges that he was repeatedly assured by defendant, both verbally and in writing, that when an Industrial Relations Manager's position became available he would be given the opportunity to take it. He was also assured, according to the complaint, that "all efforts would be made to retain the

plaintiff until he reached the mandatory retirement age of 65" (Complaint, ¶ 6)

In late 1972, defendant considered plans for opening a plant in Syracuse, New York. Defendant announced these plans in May or June, 1973, and at that time expected to begin production in Syracuse by January 1, 1976. On several occasions during 1973, plaintiff discussed with representatives of defendant the possibility of his becoming Industrial Relations Manager of the Syracuse plant. The complaint alleges that plaintiff "was repeatedly advised by the defendant that he was being given every consideration for that position, although the plaintiff was not given every consideration for that position." (Complaint, ¶ 8)

It is further alleged that defendant "had commenced plans for interviews" for the Syracuse IRM position before plaintiff was involuntarily retired, and that a person was hired for that position in early 1974 and began his duties in that capacity even before his transfer to Syracuse in July 1974. Plaintiff therefore contends that the position in question existed at the time of plaintiff's forced retirement, but that it was not offered to him because of his age. The operative allegation of the complaint states:

The defendant advised the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be 64 years of age when productions [sic] commenced in Syracuse and that the plaintiff could, therefore, not have that job.

(Complaint, ¶ 10) The complaint does not specify which representative of defendant made this representation to plaintiff.

Plaintiff contends that he learned only after his forced retirement that defendant maintained that it had failed to transfer him to the Syracuse plant on the grounds of his work experience and performance. He alleges that he was denied transfer to the Syracuse job solely because of his

age, and that defendant thereby wilfully violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Title 29 United States Code, §§ 621, *et seq.*

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Failure to file complaint under New York Human Rights Law.

Title 29 United States Code, § 626(d) provides as follows:

(d) No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed—

(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or

(2) in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies, within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or within thirty days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.

Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue, the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons named therein as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.

Title 29 United States Code, § 633(b) provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing

or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted the requirements of these two sections in *Goger v. H. K. Porter Co., Inc.*, 492 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1974). *Goger* involved a suit by plaintiff against her former employer for terminating her employment on grounds of age. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the ADEA required plaintiff to submit a complaint to the appropriate New Jersey state agency at least 60 days before instituting an action in federal court.

On appeal, Judge Hunter identified the issue as whether § 663(b) required the plaintiff to seek redress initially before the appropriate state agency, assuming that one existed, before beginning suit in federal court. Plaintiff *Goger* had not done so; rather, her counsel had notified the Secretary of Labor under § 626(d) shortly after she was dismissed. The Secretary's attempts to achieve a voluntary disposition were in vain, and the Secretary's compliance officer had advised plaintiff that she was free to institute suit.

In the face of the arguments of *Goger*, and of the Secretary of Labor as *amicus*, that the ADEA gives an aggrieved individual a choice of pursuing federal or state remedies rather than requiring that individual to seek redress first from a § 633(b) state agency if one exists in the state in which the alleged violation took place, Judge Hunter wrote:

We agree with the district court, however, that although the Act does not require an aggrieved person to exhaust state remedies as a condition precedent to the institution of a federal suit, it does require that the State be given a threshold period of sixty days in which it may attempt to resolve the controversy, normally by voluntary compliance.

492 F.2d at 15. Judge Hunter made an extensive comparison of the ADEA and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Nevertheless, the court vacated the decision of the district court on "equitable" grounds. Judge Hunter noted *Goger's* and the Secretary's argument that *Goger's* federal complaint should not be barred because she filed in federal court only after seeking relief from the Department of Labor, and after a Labor Department compliance officer had advised her that she was free to file suit. Judge Hunter wrote:

While we do not consider the failure to file a timely complaint with the appropriate state agency a mere "technical" omission [footnote omitted], we nonetheless consider equitable relief to be appropriate in view of the total absence to our knowledge, of any judicial decision construing section 633(b) during the period involved here and in view of the remedial purpose of the 1967 Act. [footnote omitted] In the future, however, we think the Congressional intent that state agencies be given the initial opportunity to act should be strictly followed and enforced. [citation omitted]

For the reason stated in the first sentence of this paragraph, we need not decide on this record whether a plaintiff must always proceed first before the state agencies.

492 F.2d at 16-17. (Emphasis added)

In the Court's view, the underlining passage confirms that *Goger* does not hold what defendant asserts that it holds: that in this Circuit failure to proceed first before a § 633(b) agency is a jurisdictional defect. The majority opinion must be considered in the context of Judge Garth's concurring opinion, in which he asserts:

The various dissimilarities between the two Acts (and in particular the presence of § 633(a) [footnote citing text of § 633(a) omitted] in ADEA, which has no counterpart in Title VII) impel me to the conclusion that there is no requirement that a plaintiff must first attempt to utilize available state remedies before filing suit under the 1967 Act. . . .

I do not believe that it was the intent of Congress to require, prior to the institution of a Federal action, the commencement of a State proceeding which, under § 633(d), need not be concluded and which in any event would be superseded by the filing of the Federal action under § 633(a).

492 F.2d at 17-18. The holding of the Court of Appeals in *Goger* is limited to the facts of that case, and the court specifically declined to hold that a state proceeding must always be commenced, where appropriate under § 633(b), before the federal action lies.

Those courts which have considered this issue since *Goger* have split on the question. Dictum by the Ninth Circuit expresses agreement with Judge Hunter's majority opinion, but disposes of the case on the ground that there was no state agency in California which qualified under § 633(b). *Curry v. Continental Airlines*, 513 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf. *Garces v. Sagner International, Inc.*, 534 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1976). The district court opinions are split. In *Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp.*, 382 F.Supp. 143 (E.D.Mich.1974), the court held that § 633(b) created a

jurisdictional requirement that plaintiff pursue remedies before a state agency if the agency qualifies under § 633(b), and that this jurisdictional requirement "can be waived only when the plaintiff has justifiably and detrimentally relied upon official advice in neglecting to pursue state remedies." 382 F.Supp. at 146. The court cited *Goger* as an example of justifiable detrimental reliance. The *Vaughn* court held that in the case before it the plaintiff had failed to show "detrimental reliance or the like which would influence the Court in the exercise of its equitable discretion. The failure of the complaint to set forth a timely resort to state remedies is, therefore, a fatal jurisdictional defect as to the plaintiff Vaughn." 382 F.Supp. at 146.

The two most recent district court decisions hold otherwise. In *Skoglund v. Singer Co.*, 403 F.Supp. 797 (D.N.H. 1975), plaintiff filed with the state agency seven months after the alleged act. The law of Massachusetts, the state in which the discrimination was alleged to have occurred, required such filing to be made within six months. Thus plaintiff was barred from state relief, and the district court was faced with the issue whether plaintiff's failure to file timely before the state agency precluded the federal court from taking jurisdiction. After reviewing the cases which had interpreted the ADEA's various filing requirements strictly, Judge Bownes held:

I do not believe that plaintiff's failure to timely comply with Section 633(b) deprives this court of the power to hear this case. There is no indication in either the history or the wording of ADEA that the Section 633(b) requirement is jurisdictional. . . . I find that, although Section 633(b) requires timely resort to state remedies before a complaint may be filed in federal court, this requirement is not jurisdictional; therefore, plaintiff's failure to notify the

Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in a timely fashion does not bar him from this court. 403 F.Supp. at 802-803.

The court cited a recent declaration of the Supreme Court:

Such technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.

Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527, 92 S.Ct. 616, 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972) (failure to comply with procedural technicality under Title VII deferral to state agencies held no bar to federal suit).

The most recent case involving the requirements of § 633(b) is *Vasquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.*, 405 F.Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975). After an exhaustive examination of the legislative history of the ADEA, and specifically endorsing Judge Garth's opinion in *Goger*, Judge Pesquera wrote:

The legislative history of the ADEA is thus devoid of any indication that Congress intended to restrict an individual's right to file suit under the Federal law to cases in which proceedings had first been commenced under State law, and this indication cannot be supplied by looking at the legislative history of Title VII. . . . So far as the ADEA is concerned, *the sole Congressional purpose underlying the enactment of Section 14 [29 U.S.C. § 633] was to give the State time to act on a complaint if the aggrieved chose to proceed there first.* To hold otherwise would be to create a procedural pitfall for unsuspecting individuals which could easily serve, as it did in the instant case . . . to deprive aggrieved individuals of their day in court, thereby thwarting the objective of this

remedial legislation, whose declared purpose, as stated in Section 2(b) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 621(b)), is "to promote the employment of older [workers] based on their ability rather than age" and "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment."

405 F.Supp. at 1357. (Emphasis added)

After consideration of all the decided cases, this Court holds that § 633(b) creates no jurisdictional requirement. The language of that section carefully avoids what would have been a simple statement of an exhaustion requirement, and suggests only that if a state proceeding is brought, the state agency should be given 60 days to act before the federal proceeding supplants it. *See* Title 29 United States Code, § 633(a).

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, and in the alternative for summary judgment, on the basis of plaintiff's failure to commence proceedings under the New York Human Rights Law will be denied.

B. Notification of the Secretary of Labor of intent to sue.

The Act provides for two alternative time limits for filing of notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor. Title 29 United States Code, § 626(d). The statute provides that no civil action may be commenced under the Act until the prospective plaintiff gives the Secretary at least 60 days' notice of an intent to file the action. The notice must be filed with the Secretary within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, except that "in a case to which section 633(b) of this title applies," the notice may be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Since the Court has held that plaintiff was not required to commence proceedings under state law before bringing the instant civil action, it is appropriate to hold him to

the shorter filing period of 180 days. *Skoglund v. Singer Co.*, *supra*, at 803.

Defendant does not contest that plaintiff filed a notice of intent to sue with the Secretary at least 60 days before filing the instant complaint. The issue is solely whether plaintiff fulfilled the filing requirement within the 180-day period of § 626(d)(1). Plaintiff was terminated by defendant on December 31, 1973. It is plaintiff's contention that his notice of intent to sue was filed with the Secretary on June 17, 1974. Defendant maintains that the notice was not filed until October 2, 1975. The instant action was commenced on December 23, 1975.

Plaintiff states by affidavit that he visited the Paterson, New Jersey office of the Department of Labor on June 17, 1974. At that time he apparently lodged an oral complaint with the Department, and submitted copies of his correspondence with defendant. The first written evidence of plaintiff's complaint is his letter dated June 25, 1974 to the Area Director of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor in Milwaukee, defendant's principal place of business. The letter briefly summarizes plaintiff's complaint and makes reference both to the June 17 meeting with a compliance officer in the Paterson office of the Division, and to the supporting correspondence which was apparently filed in Paterson on June 17 for forwarding to Milwaukee.

Plaintiff concedes that neither the June 17 oral complaint nor the June 25 letter specifically set forth an intent to sue:

When the Plaintiff notified the Secretary on June 17, 1974, he set forth in detail the nature of his grievance against the Defendant and the basis for which he was making such a charge. It is conceded that the Plaintiff did not specifically state that he intended to sue Schlitz in his initial claim filed with the Secretary. The Plaintiff submits, however, that the notice given was satisfactory to satisfy Section 626(d) of "the Act."

Brief of Plaintiff, at 4. No such specific notice of intent to sue was filed until October 2, 1975, well beyond either the 180- or 300-day period.

Plaintiff contends that an aggrieved individual's obligation to notify the Secretary is fulfilled "if an employee within 180 days of his discharge advises the Secretary that he has been discharged from his employment because of an alleged Act of Discrimination based upon age." (Brief, at 4) Plaintiff relies on *Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp.*, 369 F.Supp. 911 (N.D.Ga.1973). In that case, plaintiff made an oral complaint to the Labor Department 160 days after the alleged violation. The Department processed the complaint and told her that it had been timely filed, but that the Department had 60 days to attempt conciliation. Her formal notice of intent to sue was not filed until she had retained a lawyer, about 250 days after the unlawful act. Chief Judge Smith wrote:

This court holds that where an employee, within one hundred eighty days of his discharge, reports to the Labor Department that he has been discharged from his job because his employer discriminates against older workers, the employee's right to file suit later under the Age Discrimination Act is preserved, even if the employee does not in so many words declare to the Department his intent to file such an action.

The persons making complaints to the Department will in the most part not be lawyers; they should not be compelled to adhere to strict rules of pleading merely to preserve their right to come to court to enforce their right to be free of discrimination [in] employment because of their age. If they are to be able to enforce the Age Discrimination Act, their complaints should be construed not narrowly and technically, but broadly and liberally. Where the employee identifies himself and his employer and reports facts which, if true, would support a cause of action pursuant to the

Act, the Labor Department should assume that the aggrieved employee will take whatever steps are necessary to enforce his rights, including court action; thus, an intent to file suit is implied in a complaint of age discrimination in employment.

369 F.Supp. at 915.

The court's analysis of the Act's purpose in *Woodford* was expressly endorsed by the Eighth Circuit in *Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.*, 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975). Though that case turned on the determination of the date of the unlawful occurrence, the Court observed:

The Age Discrimination Act is remedial and humanitarian legislation. It is to be construed liberally to achieve its purpose of protecting older employees from discrimination. See *Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp.*, 369 F.Supp. 911, 914-15 (N.D.Ga.1973). A procedural requirement of the Act, of doubtful requirement of the Act, of doubtful meaning in a given case, should not be interpreted to deny an employee a claim for relief unless to do so would clearly further some substantial goal of the Act. *Id.*, at 914-15.

525 F.2d at 93-94. The court observed that most courts have regarded the timely filing of a notice of intent to sue as a jurisdictional requirement, citing *Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 494 F.2d 485, 487-488 (5th Cir. 1974), but held that the plaintiff's actions in *Moses* were not to be considered a failure to file a timely notice.

The *Moses* court identified the purpose of the 180-day requirement:

The 180-day notice requirement is intended to serve the purposes of the Act by insuring that the Secretary of Labor is called in for conciliation purposes when disputes are fresh and by informing the employer of his

employee's intentions at an early date. *Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp.*, 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974). See also *Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, supra, 494 F.2d at 488.

525 F.2d at 94.

Application of this reasoning to the facts here leads this Court to conclude that no substantial purpose of the Act would be furthered by barring plaintiff's complaint. The correspondence submitted to the Court by both parties makes clear that the complaint made by plaintiff on June 25, 1974 was immediately assigned to a Labor Department compliance officer. The same procedure was followed by the Department in *Goger* after the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a letter that did specifically state an intent to sue. 492 F.2d at 14-15. For all purposes contemplated by the statute, therefore, the June 25 letter put the instant matter before the Secretary, and he was enabled by the complaint and the correspondence furnished by plaintiff to proceed with whatever voluntary conciliation proceedings he desired to conduct. The Department's letter of July 11, 1974 makes specific reference to those conciliation, conference and persuasion procedures.

The second goal of the notice requirement, as analyzed by the Eighth Circuit in *Moses*, is to inform the employer of the employee's pending grievance. Defendant relies on *Dartt v. Shell Oil Co.*, 10 FEP Cases 844 (D.Okla.1975), in which the court held that the 180-day requirement was jurisdictional, and that the mere filing of a complaint with the Department of Labor without mentioning an intent to sue did not satisfy the statute. The court held that the purpose of the 180-day provision was to ensure "that a potential defendant become aware of its status and the possibility of litigation reasonably soon after the alleged discrimination." 10 FEP Cases at 848.

Since the Secretary does not automatically notify the potential defendant until a letter specifically stating "I intend to sue" is received, defendant argues, construction of a mere complaint letter as a notice of intent to sue thwarts a substantial purpose of the 180-day requirement.

It is true that the Secretary did not inform Schlitz of plaintiff's complaint until the Department received the formal "intent to sue" letter dated October 2, 1975. The Department sent Schlitz formal notification of Smith's intent to sue by letter of October 6, 1975, its only notice to Schlitz, and set up a conference between a compliance officer and a Schlitz representative. *See* Affidavit of William R. Young. It is nevertheless clear, however, that plaintiff and defendant had been in regular correspondence with regard to plaintiff's grievance for a substantial period of time between plaintiff's termination in December, 1973 and plaintiff's first contact with the Department of Labor in June, 1974. Plaintiff's June 25 letter to the Department states that copies of correspondence between plaintiff and defendant's Vice President in charge of Industrial Relations and defendant's President and Chairman of the Board were submitted to the compliance officer in Paterson, and the Department's July 11, 1974 letter to plaintiff confirms that this correspondence was filed. Defendant can hardly contend that it was unaware of plaintiff's grievance. It would be unrealistic to suggest that defendant was ignorant of the intentions of a management employee who had prosecuted his grievance in so assiduous a manner. Both *Dartt* and defendant rely on *Powell v. Southwestern Bell Telephone*, 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the court held the 180-day requirement to be jurisdictional, and commented:

It is logical that the 180 day notice was intended to insure that potential defendants would become aware of their status and the possibility of litigation reasonably soon after the alleged discrimination since the notice

goes from the Secretary of Labor on to the employer involved. In turn this would promote the good faith negotiation of employers during the 60 day conciliation period and provide an opportunity for preservation of evidence and records for use at a trial necessitated by failure of negotiation.

494 F.2d at 488.

Both *Powell* and *Dartt* hold that the 180-day filing requirement is jurisdictional. This Court agrees. The real question here is whether plaintiff's prompt filing of a letter of complaint and copies of correspondence with the Labor Department satisfies this requirement. On the facts of this case, and with due regard for the remedial purpose of the Act, this Court holds that it does.

The sum of plaintiff's actions with regard both to defendant and to the Department of Labor was sufficient to satisfy the dual goals of the notice requirement. Defendant was given fair warning of the pendency of plaintiff's grievance, and the Secretary was afforded the opportunity to pursue such efforts at conciliation as he deemed appropriate. Indeed, according to plaintiff's formal notice of intent to sue, dated October 2, 1975, the department conducted an initial investigation of the complaint in June and July of 1974. Plaintiff's file was then forwarded to four separate offices of the Department over a period of 15 months. Though no final disposition was ever made, there were apparently efforts to conciliate during this period.

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, and in the alternative for summary judgment, on the basis of plaintiff's alleged failure to give timely notice to the Secretary of Labor of his intent to sue, will be denied.

C. Failure to allege the date of notice of intent to sue.

The complaint fails to specify the date on which plaintiff gave notice of intent to sue to the Secretary of Labor. Plaintiff contends in his brief that such notice was given on June 17, 1974. In the Court's view, as elucidated in this opinion, notice was given on June 25, 1974. Since plaintiff was terminated on December 31, 1973, both dates are within 180 days of termination. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint within 10 days hereof in which the date of filing of notice of intent to sue is set forth in the jurisdictional statement. On the condition that such an amended complaint be timely filed, the motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative for summary judgment, based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) will be denied.

APPENDIX D

29 U.S.C. 626

RECORDKEEPING, INVESTIGATION, AND ENFORCEMENT

SEC. 7. • • •

• • • • •

(d) No civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the individual has given the Secretary not less than sixty days' notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed—

(1) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or

(2) in a case to which section 14(b) applies, within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or within thirty days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier.

Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue, the Secretary shall promptly notify all persons named therein as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.

• • • • •

29 U.S.C. 633

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP

SEC. 14. (a) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State performing like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of age except that upon commencement of action under this Act such action shall supersede any State action.

(b) In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 7 of this Act before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated: *Provided*, That such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State authority.

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42 U.S.C. 2000e-5

PREVENTION OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

SEC. 706. • • •

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(c) In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such

proceedings have been earlier terminated, provided that such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State or local law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State or local authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State or local authority.

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N.Y. Exec. L. § 291

Sec. 291. Equality of Opportunity a Civil Right. The opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or marital status is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right. (As amended by Ch. 803, L. 1975)